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Introduction 
This paper explores the position of polyamory and bisexuality in slippery slope arguments directed 
against the campaign for same-sex marriage rights in the United States. A slippery slope designates  
an ‘idiom that, by definition, means “an idea or course of action which will lead to something 
unacceptable, wrong, or disastrous”’, linking situations in a scenario according to which allowing one 
will inevitably lead to an objectionable other (The English Oxford Living Dictionaries, 2017; see 
Rambukkana, 2015). Slippery slope arguments are frequently deployed in the field of legal debate. In 
the rhetoric of right-wing opponents legalising same-sex marriage is seen as the first step on a long 
spiral downwards toward moral decay, which will successively normalise a whole range of 
problematic and ‘unwanted’ practices. Polygamy, and in its close proximity polyamory, are usually 
the first items on a list that may further include adultery, adult incest, bestiality, pedophilia, etc. 
(Emens, 2004). The paper highlights the mobilisation of racist and nationalist tropes at the heart of 
anti-polygamy sentiments and explores the role of bisexuality in representations of polyamory. It 
thereby aims to provide a corrective to the common invisibility of bisexuality in the analysis of 
marriage equality debates (see Galupo, 2009). The critical analysis of a selection of essays published 
by the conservative US journalist Stanley Kurtz highlights the conflation of polyamory with 
bisexuality in some slippery slope scenarios.  Engaging with Kurtz’s work is important because it has 
been popular in policy-making circles and monitors closely developments within cultural theory and 
political activism in order to counter the legal recognition of relationship diversity.  
Slippery slope arguments have been a constant feature of the debates about same-
sex marriage rights in the USA and other countries (Cardoso, 2014; Pallotta-Chiarolli, 2010; 
Pérez Navarro, 2017; Rambukkana, 2015; Sheff, 2011). Analysing the slippery slope dynamic 
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is important for understanding both the conditionality of the persisting hostility against 
consensual non-monogamies and LGBTQ1 intimacies and the shape of social movement 
politics that aim to challenge it. In particular, the article shows that the ‘concept shift’ 
(Jefferson, 2014) at the heart of the sequences that links same-sex marriage with polygamy 
and polyamory mobilises profoundly racialised representations sustained by the legacies of 
racism and settler colonialism.  
Same-Sex Marriage, Plural Marriage, and the Slippery Slope  
The campaign for same-sex marriage rights has been on the top of the agenda of LGBT 
lobbying organisations for many years. After decades of strategic litigation in both state and 
federal courts, activists for marriage equality in the USA were able to celebrate major 
successes over the last few years. Two United States Supreme Court Decisions finally paved 
the way to same-sex marriage. United States v. Windsor (2013) declared Section 3 of the 
Defence of Marriage Act (DOMA) (1996) as unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause 
and the Fifth Amendment. This Section had specified that the term ‘marriage’ only applied 
to monogamous heterosexual legal unions and that the term ‘spouse’ was limited to a 
husbands and wives in ‘other-sex’ couple relationships. In Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), the 
United States Supreme Court finally held that the ‘fundamental right to marry’ could not be 
withheld from same-sex couples in the light of the Due Process and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Denniston, 2015). 
Obergefell over-ruled all remaining state laws that either ban same-sex marriage or refuse 
to recognise marriages that were conducted in a different state.  The positive results of 
litigation for civil marriage rights for same-sex couples has brought the question of marriage 
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rights to the fore in the debates within polyamory activism. Aviram and Leachman (2015) 
notice a stronger engagement with questions of legal recognition of multi-partner families 
on poly Conferences and Conventions in the United States (ibid., p.306). This is a significant 
change since large parts of the polyamory movement have been wary of marriage, seeing it 
as an assimilationist practice prone to normalising poly intimacies by imposing an inflexible 
template, forcing poly activists to present themselves in a respectable and des-sexualised 
way, or legitimising the state regulation of people’s intimate and sexual behaviours (Aviram, 
2010). This normative aspect of same-sex marriage is well expressed in the following 
statement of Jodi O’Brien (2007, p. 144): ‘[S]ame gender marriage is likely to perpetuate a 
status quo that favours one particular family form and concurrent set of cultural 
expectations and practices’. Same-sex marriage narrows the scope of legal recognition by 
deflecting from more unconventional relations and zooming in on the more familiar settings 
of couple based units (Barker, 2012, p. 182).  
Most poly activists have refrained from touching upon the question of legal 
recognition of multipartner relationships because they feared that such a step would 
undermine the chances of same-sex marriage activists to advance their agenda (Aviram & 
Leachman, 2015). This has been the case primarily because opponents of marriage equality 
successfully mobilised cultural anxieties that granting civil marriage rights to same-sex 
couples would debase the institution of marriage, empty it of its values and civilising 
function by triggering a process that will ultimately open it up to other ‘unwanted’ groups, 
such as polygamists, polyamorists, pedophiles, etc. This scenario rests on the assumption 
that same-sex marriage will shatter the cultural consensus that only a monogamous 
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heterosexual union presents a proper family that provides a healthy and natural 
environment for raising children (cf. Sheff, 2011; Whitehead, 2012). Slippery slope 
Senator Rick Santorum declared in an interview with AP (Associated Press) before 
the landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) which struck down Texas sodomy 
legislation that ‘if the Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual sex within 
your home, then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the 
right to incest, you have the right to adultery. You have the right to anything.’ (USA Today 
2003; see also Loughlin, 2003).  
Dissenting judge Justice Scalia, too, evoked a slippery slope scenario, when he 
challenged inevitable negative consequences of the libertarian impulse enshrined in 
Lawrence v. Texas. 
‘State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, 
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable 
only in light of Bowers’2 validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one 
of these laws is called into question by today’s decision’ (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003, p. 
590). 
One (unwelcome) legal change will thus lead to another, with moral decline being 
the inevitable consequence. The same rationality has structured the slippery-slope-type of 
arguments against same-sex marriage. The following argument by Stanley Kurtz is a good 
example:  
 ‘Once we say that gay couples have the right to have their commitments recognized 
by the state, it becomes next to impossible to deny that same right to polygamists, 
polyamorists, or even cohabiting relatives and friends. And once, every one’s 
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relationship is recognized, marriage is gone, and only a system of flexible 
relationship contracts is left’ (Kurtz, 2003).  
Monogamy and the dyadic principle are described as the unique qualities of 
marriage that define its spiritual essence and secure its unity and status as a normative 
cultural institution. Kurtz aligns himself with a long tradition within US marriage law that 
sees marriage as a natural and quasi-sanctified, if not God-given, institution whose 
meanings go far beyond the logic of a civil contract (Ertman, 2010). Contract logic will trigger 
the slippery slope and polygamy and polyamory are named as the first items on the list of 
unwelcome consequences. Before I will explore the discursive features of these links, it is 
worthwhile to look a bit closer at the linguistic qualities of slippery slope arguments. 
According to Stenvoll Doug (2008), slippery slope arguments imply movement and 
inevitability within a process-logic. This reasoning tends to reframe politics as a quasi-
physical process by connecting concepts like material objects in a way that implies unilinear 
notions of impact and causality. This is reductionist and decomplexifies politics. Moreover, 
the directionality of slippery slope metaphors is almost always downward, drawing on a 
symbolism that equates upward with good and downward with bad. At the heart of slippery 
slope arguments operates a distinctive kind of metaphorical reasoning (either as a cognitive 
process or an ideological attempt at framing) that associates different categories with each 
other, stressing their similarity, proximity or – in extreme cases – identity. In the case of the 
debates on marriage equality, same-sex marriage has been persistently linked with 
polygamy and polyamory without any regards for the differences between these concepts 
and practices (Denike, 2010). 
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‘Un-American Intimacies’:  Polygamy, Criminal Law, and the Nation State  
There is a long history of anti-polygamy sentiment in the United States and polygamy has 
been criminalised since the 19th century by the means of anti-bigamy laws relating to federal 
court and Supreme Court rulings (Burgett, 2005; Myers, 2009). Monogamy has been 
endorsed a natural or divine (Christian) institution and a symbol of civilisation in many 
European countries and (European) colonial settler societies across the globe (Willey, 2006), 
but the anti-polygamy campaign in the United States has been propelled by a peculiar 
mixture of cultural tensions and political collisions closely bound up with its national history. 
According to Martha Ertman (2010), the contemporary ban of polygamy in the United Sates 
stemmed from 19th century attempts to contain Mormonism as a cultural and political force 
and to stop the Mormon Church from establishing a separatist theocracy in Utah which led 
to accusation of both political and race treason (see also Cott, 2000; Myers, 2009; 
Strassberg, 1997). Mormons were cast as backward and primitive for adopting a form of 
marriage that was considered to be natural for Asian, African or native American groups, but 
not for white citizens of the United States. The condemnation of the allegedly ‘primitive’ 
Mormon marriage model that was conflated with promiscuity reveals the profoundly 
racialised character of marriage as an institution. The racial dimension of the project of 
marriage in US history is underscored by the destruction of African family ties through the 
period of slavery (Davis, 1982), the pathologisation of Black families in post-slavery US 
family policy (Cooper, 2001), the history of anti-miscengenation laws (Battalora, 2009), and 
the prevalence of racialised inequalities within the sphere of intimacy through the 
persistence of racist representation of Black genders after Loving v. Virginia (Collins, 2004). 
The discussion about polygamy and plural marriage in the USA is a key process indicating 
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the ‘centrality of racial politics to marriage regimes’ (Stacey and Meadow, 2009, p. 167) and 
the iconic position of monogamy in discourses of white supremacy (Schippers, 2016).   
It was due to the charges of non-monogamy and promiscuity that Mormons were 
cast as a distinct degenerate race, i.e. as non-White and/or as traitors of the white race. The 
alleged physical degeneration of Mormons was then linked again with a critique of the 
group’s alleged submission to despotism, seen as a ‘primitive form of government [that] was 
common among supposedly backward races’ (Ertman, 2010, p. 289, see also Burgett 2005). 
Popular depictions of Mormons (in newspapers, magazines, and cartoons) represented 
them as Black or Asian and their offspring as disorderly and multiply racialised. This reveals 
the centrality of miscegenation fears to the anti-polygamy campaigns after the issuing of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of 1868.  
The disparaging and racist framing of polygamy in Reynolds v. United States (1879) 
are illustrative of these concerns. The Court suggested that polygamy was offensive to 
northern and western European national cultures and ‘almost exclusively a feature of the 
life of Asiatic and African people’ (Reynolds v. United States, p. 164). Polygamy has thus 
been defined as ‘un-American’ in both popular and legal discourse and racism has shaped 
perceptions of plural marriage since the 19th century (Stacey & Meadow, 2009).  
At the same time, polygamy is seen as a hyper-patriarchal practice in which no 
women would ever engage in as a result of her free decision. Plural marriage is primarily 
looked at from the point of view of harm (for both women and children) (Gher, 2008; 
Rambukkana, 2015). ‘Since the 19th century, critics have associated polygamy with male 
power and sexual promiscuity and portrayed it as antithetical to women’s interests’, state 
Stacey and Meadow (2009, p. 183). Many feminist critics of the practice have asserted the 
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association of polygamy with constraints on women’s autonomy, girls’ lack of access to 
education, child poverty, marriage under the age of consent, sexual abuse, and rape 
(Chatlani, 2006). Others, however, argue that these problems are not limited to polygamous 
intimacies, that it  is wrong to stigmatise entire communities, and that legal and policy 
frameworks other than an out-right ban would be in place to address such problems should 
they occur within the context of polygamous intimacies or elsewhere (Lenon, 2016). 
Moreover, Ertman (2010) suggests that the gender equality and the well-being of children 
was never the sole concern of US anti-polygamy law which did not only ban the practice of 
plural marriage but further stripped polygamists of other rights, including immigration, 
advocating polygamy or holding a public office (see also Burgett, 2005 and Klein, 2010). For 
Ertman, ‘race is at the center of antipolygamy law, in a way that forces us to rethink the ban 
itself’ (2010, p. 288).  
The same applies to anti-polygamy laws in Canada. Anti-polygamy laws in Canada 
were legitimised by the threat of fundamentalist Mormons emigrating from the United 
States to Canada in the 1880s and 1890s in order to escape state persecution on the other 
side of the border. However, as Denike (2010) explains, the law was crafted in a way that 
allowed it to be used against any form of polygamy deemed to be ‘un-Christian’ in nature 
and spirit. For instance, Canadian criminal anti-bigamy laws were first used to persecute 
aboriginal peoples. ‘The new criminal law was instrumental in consolidating the religious 
persuasions and customs of the new nation against the Jewish, Muslim, Asian, Indian, and 
Aboriginal customs with which polygamy was associated’ (pp. 139-140). Anti-bigamy laws 
were core to the politics of white supremacy that underpinned the erasure of indigenous 
ways by settler colonialism (Lenon, 2016). The 2011 judgement Reference re: s.293 of the 
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Criminal Code of Canada of the British Columbian Supreme Court that upheld the 
constitutionality of the prohibition of polygamy reproduces many of the tropes that have 
driven white settler colonial framings of polygamy since the 19th century (Ashley, 2014). 
The history of anti-polygamy legislation in North America demonstrates that racism 
has been deeply intertwined with these laws and that marriage and monogamy are 
profoundly racialised cultural practices.  Whenever morally conservative opponents of 
same-sex marriage evoke the threat of polygamy, they also mobilise these assumptions and 
associations. The linkage of Mormon polygamy with African or Asiatic practices that were 
said to be ‘odious among the northern and western nations of Europe’ in law (Reynolds v. 
United States 1879, p. 164) and in representations within popular culture (Burgett, 2005 and 
Ertman, 2010) produced a discourse of this group persisting predominantly of white 
Christians as ‘metaphorically non-white’ (see Cott, 2000). However, this process should not 
let us overlook the fact that most Mormons in the USA are white and that leaders of the 
fundamentalist movement have been subscribing to a racist vision of white supremacy (see 
Manson, 2005).  However, more recently polygamy has also been a salient topic within the 
repertoire of Islamophobic discourse that implicitly or explicitly targets other racialised 
groups, such as people of Asian descent (Puar, 2007; Rambukkana, 2015) 
The repetitive positioning of polyamory next to polygamy within downward spiralling 
slippery slope sequences results in polyamory, too, being associated with these judgments, 
without the speaker ever having to make the effort of having to argue about similarities and 
differences in detail. The ‘repetition of proximity’, Ahmed (2011) argues, can render 
associations ‘essential’ in perception. Within this process, an alleged ‘essential’ affinity 
between polygamy and polyamory is asserted and polygamy’s racialised attributes pass over 
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and start to ‘stick’ (see Ahmed, 2004). The racial imagery bound up with plural marriage is a 
potent agent that helps to explain some of the anxieties that are mobilised by slippery slope 
scenarios.  
In the following section, I will look at how polygamy and polyamory figure in the 
slippery slope discourse of the Conservative journalist Stanley Kurtz. Kurtz’s work is 
interesting because it explicitly addresses the role that bisexuality plays in polyamory 
cultures and because it reflects bisexuality’s strategic value for pushing equality-based 
arguments for plural marriage. In the context of this discussion, it is important to keep in 
mind that bisexuality, too, has historically been represented as a primitive cultural trait and 
an atavistic throw-back of the evolutionary process (see Angelides, 2000; Storr, 1999). Even 
if the traces of these histories are not easily discernible at the surface of contemporary 
discourses on bisexuality, they form an integral element of the racialised dynamics that have 
driven the debates on polygamy and same-sex marriage.      
Polyamory and Bisexuality in the Cultural Critique of Stanley Kurtz  
Polyamory has been mentioned in slippery slope arguments against same-sex marriage 
rights in the courts and within the wider media sphere (Antalffy, 2011; Whitehead, 2012). It 
was deployed by a wide range of public figures, including the former Senator Rick Santorum, 
the former Supreme Court Justice Antonin Gregory Scalia, the founder of ‘Focus on the 
Family’ James Dobson, and the anthropologist and journalist Stanley Kurtz, whose 
conservative commentaries have appeared in many publications, including The Weekly 
Standard and The National Review. Kurtz work has been widely disseminated within the 
networks of conservative and right-wing Christian organisations, such as the Family 
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Research Council, Focus on the Family, Concerned Women for America and the Traditional 
Values Coalition. They were cited in Congress debates and referred to by federal 
government staff (Ashbee, 2007). The influence of Kurtz’s work can also be inferred from 
the fact that it is discussed in most publications critical of the slippery slope reasoning 
(Antalffy, 2011; Pallotta-Chiarolli, 2010; Sheff, 2011). While Kurtz’s work has been 
frequently commented upon, his treatment of bisexuality has not yet been tackled in detail.  
In the following, I refer to a small number of selected articles that address same-sex 
marriage through the prism of slippery slope scenarios that also involve references to non-
monogamy, polygamy, polyamory, homosexuality or bisexuality. In ‘Beyond Gay Marriage: 
The Road to Polyamory’ Kurtz (2003) presents an anti-promiscuity argument that is based 
on ideas that are deeply engrained in homophobic equations of gay men with excessive 
sexualisation (cf. Warner, 1999; Klesse, 2007). 
‘‘The trouble is, gay marriage itself threatens the ethos of monogamy. The 
"conservative" case for gay marriage holds that state-sanctioned marriage will 
reduce gay male promiscuity. But what if the effect works in reverse? What if, 
instead of marriage reducing gay promiscuity, sexually open gay couples help 
redefine marriage as a non-monogamous institution? There is evidence that this is 
exactly what will happen’ (Kurtz, 2003). 
Same-sex marriage (cast as ‘gay marriage’ in Kurtz’s terminology)3 will break the 
connection of marriage with monogamy and thus lead to polygamy and polyamory. This is 
just a question of time: ‘The gay marriage movement took more than a decade to catch fire. 
A movement for state-sanctioned polygamy-polyamory could take as long’, suggests Kurtz 
(2003). According to Kurtz, one of the last features of ‘proper’ marriage that has survived 
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the tides of time is monogamy. Breaking this link will undermine the vital function of 
marriage to create stable families. While Kurtz warns of both the legalisation of polygamous 
and polyamorous marriage,  evoking the possibility for multiple partner choice outside of a 
monosexual framework (i.e. gender-plural polyamory) seems to be an even more troubling 
vision of plural marriage than heteronormative polygyny.  
Kurtz discusses polygamy and polyamory in a parallel fashion: Both are associated 
with promiscuity, even if in slightly different ways. In the case of ‘non-Western’ polygamy, 
the problem is defined as one of adulterous male promiscuity. Kurtz cites a Nigerian survey 
of sex out-side of marriage in order to underscore his point. ‘Even though polygamous 
marriage is less about sex than security, societies that permit polygamy tend to reject the 
idea of marital fidelity for everyone, polygamists included’, Kurtz (2003) argues. With regard 
to Mormon polygamy, Kurtz alleges that although contemporary Mormon ethics condemn 
non-marital sex and advocate romantic notions of love, polygamous arrangements would be 
instable and unpractical. Because of this, ‘polygamy let loose in modern secular America 
would destroy our understanding of marital fidelity, while putting nothing viable in its place’ 
(Kurtz, 2003).  
Kurtz then goes on to discuss polyamory as a form of ‘postmodern polygamy’. 
Polyamory, is described as a shrouded mode of promiscuity: ‘Supposedly, polyamory is not a 
synonym for promiscuity. In practice, though, there is a continuum between polyamory and 
"swinging."’ (Kurtz, 2003). Whereas polygamy is at least predictable because it is moulded 
by patriarchal interpretations of heterosexuality, polyamory is shaped by fluidity, excess, 
and unpredictability. Kurtz evokes bisexuality as a figure of bewilderment and confusion, the 
major function of which seems to be the undoing of any certainty regarding desire and 
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partner choice. ‘Unlike classic polygamy, which features one man and several women, 
polyamory comprises a bewildering variety of sexual combinations. There are triads of one 
woman and two men; heterosexual group marriages; groups in which some or all members 
are bisexual; lesbian groups, and so forth’, states Kurtz (2003).  Kurtz mentions bisexuality 
once in passing.  However, in a later article, Kurtz engages with bisexuality in much more 
detail, this time treating it as a fully rationalised concept that functions as a hinge between 
and same-sex marriage and plural marriage in legal strategies of the marriage equality 
movement.   
Routes to Plural Marriage: Bisexuality, Sexual Orientation, and Equal Protection  
In ‘Here Come the Brides. Plural Marriage is Waiting in the Wings’, Kurtz (2005a) objects to 
equality arguments based on ‘sexual orientation’ reasoning. If gay marriage should be 
legalised, because the right of marriage cannot be denied to a sexual minority, then other 
organised minorities will be able to do the same. Kurtz’s discussion is primarily concerned 
with ‘polyamory’, but in many parts his argument rests on theorising the connection 
between polyamory and bisexuality. ‘TWO DEVELOPING LINES of legal argument may 
someday bring about state recognition for polyamorous marriage: the argument from 
polyamory, and the argument from bisexuality’, Kurtz argues. In his analysis of the legal 
arguments around polyamory, Kurtz engages with Emens’s (2004) suggestion to consider 
polyamory as a disposition (cf. also Kurtz, 2005b). While Emens assumes that there is a little 
bit of ‘poly’ inside all of us, some people are more intensely dispositioned to polyamory 
than others. ‘Whether for biological or cultural reasons, says Emens, some folks simply 
cannot live happily without multiple simultaneous sexual partners. And for those people, 
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Emens argues, our current system of marriage is every bit as unjust as it is for homosexuals’ 
(Kurtz 2005a). Although Emens shies away from stating a (psychobiological) sexual 
orientation argument, her framing of disposition as a minoritarian position allows for an 
analogy with homosexuality, i.e. a status widely recognised to be a ‘sexual orientation’ 
(Klesse, 2014, 2016).   
In his discussion of the legal arguments around bisexuality, Kurtz (2005a) turns to 
Yoshino’s (2000) influential article ‘The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure’. Although 
Yoshino does not define bisexuality as a sexual orientation, Kurtz highlights tropes which 
can be developed into this direction. ‘Defining bisexuality as a "more than incidental desire" 
for partners of both sexes, Yoshino examines the best available academic studies on sexual 
orientation and finds that each of them estimates the number of bisexuals as equivalent to, 
or greater than, the number of homosexuals’ (ibid.). Bisexuals, even if not often recognised 
as a ‘sexual orientation’ in their own right, can thus be seen as the largest sexual minority on 
the LGB spectrum, out-numbering lesbian and gay men (see Eisner 2013).  
After Kurtz has documented discourses that establish bisexuality as a sexual 
orientation, he aims to demonstrate an innate connection between bisexuality and 
polyamory. Kurtz acknowledges that many bisexuals are monogamous, but then points out 
research that highlights strong proclivities toward polyamory within bisexual communities 
(cf. Rust, 1996). Polyamory would therefore be sufficiently engrained in that ‘more than 
incidental desire’ of bisexuality to make claims to the rights of multipartner marriage on the 
grounds of a sexual orientation-based minority status plausible and justifiable. This is why 
gay marriage will lead to bisexual marriage and group marriage. ‘If every sexual orientation 
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has a right to construct its own form of marriage, then more changes are surely due. For 
what gay marriage is to homosexuality, group marriage is to bisexuality’ (Kurtz, 2005a).  
Kurtz reminds those who do not take this development seriously, e.g. because they 
believe bisexuality or polyamory to be merely fringe phenomena, that the social movements 
associated with these identities are on the rise, which will provide advocates with the 
resources and organisational strongholds necessary for advancing litigations. Kurtz inserts 
quotes of a contributor to the 2004 Polyamory special issue of the Journal of Bisexuality to 
highlight the coalitional aspirations and potentials of bi/poly activism, including the 
statements: ‘Poly activism is bi activism. . . . The bi/poly dynamic has the potential to move 
both communities towards a point of culture-wide visibility, which is a necessary step on the 
road to acceptance.’ (Mint 2004, 72 and 73, as cited in Kurtz, 2005a). For Kurtz, 
mobilisations around bisexuality provide key rationales for plural marriage based on 
equality arguments. It is interesting to note that with the advancement of marriage equality 
in the United States, several authors have made the proposal to frame bisexuality or 
polyamory as sexual orientations to advance the right to plural marriage. ‘Because bisexuals 
are attracted to both men and women, expressing their sexual identity fully might require 
simultaneous relationships’, proposes for example Elizabeth Brake (2013). Aviram and 
Leachman (2015), too, suggest that a legal strategy based on an Equal Protection Clause 
arguments regarding sexual orientation could provide a successful strategy for opening up 
civil marriage to plural partnerships. Such sexual orientation-based equality strategies could 
be founded upon sexual orientation models of either bisexuality or polyamory. The authors 
indicate a preference for the latter (i.e. the polyamory approach), because it would be more 
inclusive and does not necessarily depend upon binary constructs of gender or on specific 
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gender constellations to effectively show discrimination in the courts (see Klesse 2016, 
1362-1363).  In ‘Here Come the Brides. Plural Marriage is Waiting in the Wings’, Kurtz 
(2005a) presents an entirely secular, social-science-led analysis of the political and legal 
mobilisation within legal equality movements to bolster a slippery slope argument.   
Polygamy, Polyamory, and Processes of Racialisation   
My discussion in the last two sections has shown that Kurtz attributes bisexuality a central 
role in his slippery slope rejections of same-sex marriage. Multiple conflations of bisexuality 
with polyamory are at the heart of this analysis. Firstly, Kurtz utilises bisexuality as a figure 
symbolising the destruction of orderly structures of desire and the principle of dyadic 
heterosexual monogamy and commitment. Secondly, he describes bisexuals as a core 
population of polyamorous constituencies and identifies the bisexual movement as the 
driving force behind poly activism. Thirdly, he suggests that bisexuality can provide the key 
concept for building a compelling case for plural marriage through litigation. Kurtz’s 
discussion of polygamy, polyamory, and bisexuality also contains references to race. The 
only backing Kurtz (2003) offers for his claim of the affinity of polygamy with adulterous 
promiscuity in non-Western countries is a citation of a study of sexual behaviours in Nigeria. 
This particularises African sexualities as being prone to promiscuity and thereby reproduces 
long-standing stereotypes (Mercer & Isaac, 1988). Allusions to romantic love, companionate 
marriage, and a commitment to parity between different wives in contemporary US 
Mormonism is read by Kurtz as reflecting an ‘effort to create a hybrid traditionalist/modern 
version of Mormon polygamy’ (Kurtz, 2003). However faulty in practice, western versions of 
polygamy are represented as being relatively advanced on the evolutionary road from 
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traditionalism (polygamy) to modernity (romantic love and conjugal gender parity). This 
conflation of geo-political and temporal themes within the logic of evolutionism is sustained 
by a racialising rationality (McClintock, 1995). Polygamy is coded as a backward traditional 
practice (with racialised, non-western origins) that has undergone an uncompleted process 
of modernisation within successive revisions of white US Mormonism.  According to Kurtz 
(2003), polyamory is just one step further along this line of temporal development: 
‘AMERICA'S NEW, souped-up version of polygamy is called "polyamory"’, a kind of 
‘postmodern polygamy’.  
In the previous section, I have stated that Kurtz claims a continuity between 
polyamory and swinging, a move with which he aims to prove the allegedly promiscuous 
nature of polyamory. When Kurtz explicates this view, he returns to the example of an 
alleged Nigerian polygamous/ adulterous promiscuity, which, according to Kurtz, (2003) 
could be understood to be a precursor of polyamory:  
‘And since polyamorous group marriages can be sexually closed or open, it's often 
tough to draw a line between polyamory and swinging. Here, then, is the modern 
American version of Nigeria's extramarital polygamous promiscuity. Once the 
principles of monogamous companionate marriage are breached, even for 
supposedly stable and committed sexual groups, the slide toward full-fledged 
promiscuity is difficult to halt.’ 
 Bisexuality, polygamy, and polyamory thus are linked in a chain of signification that 
operates both explicit and implicit strategies of racialisation.  
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The Effects of Sequencing: Polygamy, Polyamory, and Bisexuality  as ‘Problems’ in 
Marriage Equality Activism   
Although both polygamy and polyamory have a steady appearance in slippery slope 
arguments, it has been polygamy which has provided the more dominant framework. This is 
likely to be due to the long history of debates on polygamy in the United States, which by far 
precedes the cultural emergence of polyamory in the second part of the 20th century. As 
said, polygamy is usually the first problem mentioned, whenever slippery slope scenarios 
regarding same-sex marriage are evoked (Denike, 2010, p. 141). Polyamory is often the 
second item on the list. The sequencing of items within slippery slope arguments does not 
only establish a connection between the first term and the following ones, but also among 
the following terms with each other. It is therefore worthwhile to reflect not only on the 
effects of the discursive framing of the connection between same-sex marriage and 
polygamy and polyamory respectively, but also on the implications of the pairing of 
polygamy with polyamory.  
So called ‘empirical’ slippery slope arguments construe temporality and operate on 
the grounds of a consequentialist rationality (Volokh, 2003). Applied to the same-sex 
marriage debate, this is reflected in the assumption that the creation of same-sex civil 
marriage would create a legal precedence that will propel a dynamic that will lead to the 
realisation of legal frameworks for plural marriage. However, even empirical slippery slope 
arguments are rarely concerned with simple questions of predictability and likelihood. 
Rather they negotiate the moral implications of certain decisions. On this level, they also 
pertain to logical and conceptual matters, such as in so-called ‘no-principled distinction’ 
arguments. According to Jefferson (2014, p. 673), slippery slope sequences that are 
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constructed around a logic of ‘no-principled distinction’ attempt ‘to show that two cases 
considered to be morally different are analogous in morally relevant ways. Therefore, the 
wrongness of B implies the wrongness of A’. The most common form of the ‘non-principled 
distinction’ argument is directed ‘against the starting point of the slope on the basis that the 
principles licensing its acceptance would also license the endpoint’ (2014, p. 673). Applied to 
the same-sex marriage debate, this means that same-sex marriage (already opposed on its 
own) will license other problematic practices, such as polygamy and polyamory. Variants of 
both empirical and logical argumentative schemes can be identified in the texts by Kurtz 
(2003, 2005a).  
Slippery slope arguments dissolve the distinction between polygamy and polyamory 
allowing for a ‘concept shift’ (Jefferson, 2014) and the transference of the racialised 
connotations onto polyamory (defined as a ‘postmodern’ form of polygamy in the words of 
Kurtz (2005a). This has been particularly troubling for activists advocating marriage equality. 
In North America, LGBT marriage equality activists and their allies have usually rejected any 
connection between an argument for the right to marriage for same-sex couples and 
polygamy. Many have asserted a fundamental difference between same-sex marriage and 
plural marriage, describing polygamy as patriarchal and incomparable with the gender-
egalitarian promises of same-sex marriage (see Denike, 2010; Fischel, 2016; Redding, 2010). 
This response can be seen as both an effect and an integral part of ‘homonationalism’, 
which is defined by Puar (2007, p. 39) as a ‘collusion between homosexuality and American 
nationalism that is generated by national rhetorics of patriotic inclusion and queer subjects 
themselves’. Many proponents of same-sex marriage have further distanced themselves 
from polyamory, too, because coalitions with polyamorists have been seen as damaging to 
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the realisation of one’s own interests. Maria Pallotta-Chiarolli  (2010, pp. 7-8) argues that 
‘some advocates of non-heterosexual marriages and families endeavour to reassure 
fundamentalists such as Kurtz that the slippery slope fears  will not be realized, as only 
those relationships that are monogamous same-sex couples are “normal families like 
straights have”’. Aviram and Leachman (2015) talk about the common embitterment and 
resentment among poly activists, who feel that they have been let down by LGBT same-sex 
marriage activists.  
Of course, it is necessary to recognise that poly activists, too, have often tried to 
deny or downplay any overlap regarding the experience or interests with polygamy (Emens, 
2004; Strassberg, 2003).  Many believe that the conflation of polyamory with conventional 
religious polygyny explains much of the anti-polyamory sentiments in North American 
culture (Emens,  2004; Tweedy, 2011). There have been longstanding boundary skirmishes 
between polyamory and Mormon – but also Muslim – polygyny, which go right at the core 
of the definition of polyamory. Emens (2004, p. 307) argues: ‘The sex-based hierarchy of 
traditional Mormon polygyny seems incompatible with the typical poly dedication to 
principles of quality and individual growth, causing some polys and commentators to 
exclude Mormon polygyny from the umbrella of polyamory’. Few poly advocates take a 
more inclusive stance in this regard (see, for example West (1996), who was herself raised in 
a Mormon family).   
 ‘Polyamory has been a constant focus of opposition to same-sex marriage, figuring 
strongly in arguments made both inside and outside the courtroom’, state Aviram and 
Leachman (2015, p. 2640), a fact that has shaped the discursive terrain for any attempts to 
raise the issue of poly relationship rights. The authors believe that rather than opening 
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space for an effective mobilisation around poly relationship rights, the history of LGBT 
activism around same-sex marriage may have narrowed this spaces at least in so far as the 
standing of polyamory in the public sphere is concerned. If this assessment is correct, poly 
activism finds itself in a paradoxical situation. For the first time, at least certain factions of 
the poly community seem to have developed a taste for probing for legal relationship 
recognition. In the light of Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), questions of plural marriage are very 
likely to move to the fore even further (deBoer, 2015; Fischel, 2016).  
In the face of this situation, it becomes urgent for polyamory activists to clarify their 
position with regard to the question of marriage and their relationship to other styles of 
consensual non-monogamy. We have seen that attempts to reject the slippery slope by 
advocates of marriage equality have often led to homonormative or polynormative 
responses (cf. Puar, 2007; Wilkinson, 2010). Dealing with slippery slope arguments demands 
careful reflection, if we wish to avoid the pitfall of disassociation that is implicitly 
encouraged by the structure of these arguments. I have argued that such reflection needs to 
include a refutation of the racism that has been bound up with the debates on polygamy in 
North America (Rambukkana, 2015).   
Conclusion 
Decades of legal activism and litigation have paved the way for same-sex marriage in the 
USA. Mainstream lobbying groups have construed the question of relationship recognition 
for LGBT intimacies and families as a question of marriage equality. This strategy has always 
been contested by feminist, queer-inspired or anarchist LGBTQ activists who see marriage 
as an implicitly heteronormative institution and a status that monopolises privilege 
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(Auchmuty, 2004; Polikoff, 2009; Warner, 1999; Whitehead, 2012). In this paper, I have not 
engaged in close detail with the critique of the politics of marriage (see Klesse, 2016 for a 
more thorough discussion). Rather, I have been primarily concerned with cultural and legal 
aspects of the culture wars around marriage equality. In the USA, plural marriage has always 
been close to the heart at the controversies around same-sex marriage. Conservative 
opponents of same-sex-marriage have deployed the spectre of the legal right to polygamy 
as a deterrent in the name of ‘traditional family values’.  By dismissing association between 
same-sex marriage and polygamy ‘as rhetorical ruses for homophobia’, activists fail to 
explore the complex legacy of popular anxieties regarding marital diversity (Stacey and 
Meadow, 2009; see also Burgett, 2005).  
I have argued that questions of race, racism and colonialism are deeply implicated in 
these anxieties. Bisexuality is drawn into this process through the equation of bisexuality 
with polyamory. ‘[C]ompulsory monogamy insists on dyadic resolutions for all regardless of 
gender and race, but it is gender and race privilege that are at stake in the narratives we tell 
about monogamy and its failures’, Mimi Schippers reminds us (2016, p. 4). Many feel that 
legal recognition may provide vital support and protection for poly families and 
relationships which will contribute to the realisation of the substantial value of relational 
autonomy (Fischel, 2016). Understanding the racialised history of the institution of marriage 
could lead us to consider carefully whether relationship rights are really best fought for 
under the banner of marriage (see Farrow, 2009).  
Polikoff (2009) argues that the proper task of family law consists in protecting the 
diversity of family and care relationships, rather than specific cultural symbols, practices or 
configurations. Such an approach would discard with the belief that any singular institution 
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could safeguard recognition and protection in an inclusive fashion. One of the slippery slope 
scenarios evoked by Kurtz (2003) warns that same-sex marriage would lead to the end of 
marriage, dissolving it ‘into a variety of relationship contracts, linking two, three, or more 
individuals (however weakly and temporarily) in every conceivable combination of male and 
female’. I sympathise with Lisa Duggan (2004), who argues that rather than simply refusing 
the empirical hypothesis of this projection, we should embrace it and use it as a road-map. If 
official family policy would aim at truly supporting a diversity of legal statuses with the 
capacity for catering for people’s diverse needs and if it opened up all those statuses to 
everybody, then – and only then – might ‘[t]he moral conservative’s nightmare vision of a 
flexible menu of options (…) become a route to progressive equality!’ (Duggan, 2004). There 
is an alternative to simply opposing the slippery slope logic: That is embracing it with a 
subversive intention!  
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1 LGBTQ is an umbrella term that stands for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer. I use it occasionally 
for the sake of brevity to refer to a cluster of identities, intimacies and diverse forms of political activism. I also 
use the term LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) when I talk about more formalised forms of lobby 
politics that have been salient in the US American campaign for same-sex marriage (Whitehead, 2012). It does 
not make sense to include a reference to queer here, because queer activism has been mostly opposed to 
both same-sex marriage and representative identity and/or lobbying politics (Conrad & Nair, 2009).  
2 In Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia 
sodomy law that criminalised oral and anal sex between consenting adults on moral grounds.  
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3 I have used the term same-sex marriage throughout this article. The formulation ‘gay marriage’ is 
problematic for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the term ascribes a specific sexual orientation to those who may 
decide to enter a marriage with a person of the same gender (i.e. gay or lesbian). It therefore renders invisible 
bisexual, pansexual or queer-identified people in same-sex marriages. Using the generic term ‘gay marriage’ 
further enters an androcentric bias, since in its contemporary usage ‘gay’ is mostly used to refer to gay men 
(rather than lesbians). Organising the debate on same-sex marriage under the heading ‘gay marriage’ is thus 
exclusive with regard to several registers (see Hackl et al. 2013).  
